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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SORENSON'S RANCH SCHOOL and
SHAUN SORENSON,
Appellees,
v.
RETA D. ORAM, DIRECTOR,
STATE OF UTAH,
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
OFFICE OF LICENSING
Appellant.

Case No. 20000993-CA
Priority No. 15

BRIEF OF APPELLANT STATE OF UTAH
JURISDICTION
The State of Utah appeals from a final order of the Sixth
District Court granting summary judgment in favor of the
Plaintiffs and denying the State of Utah's motion for summary
judgment regarding the correct interpretation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 62A-4a-413 (Supp. 2000).

The matter came before the district

court on appeal from an informal adjudicative proceeding of a
state agency.

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this

case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 2000).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the district court erred in its interpretation of
section 62A-4a-413 when, contrary to principles of statutory
construction, it concluded that the only felons prohibited from
employment in a program licensed to serve children are felons who

provide direct services to the children.

This issue was

preserved in the State's Motion for Summary Judgment and its
accompanying Memorandum in Support.

(R. 35-48), as well as

during oral argument on the motion (see transcript dated August
29, 2000).
Standard of review: On appeal from a grant of summary
judgment, the appellate court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non moving party and affirms only if there
are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

When the trial court's

grant of summary judgment was based on statutory interpretation,
the appellate court reviews the question of statutory
interpretation under a correction-of-error standard.

Graham v.

Davis Co. Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Service
Dist. , 1999 UT App 136 1(7, 979 P.2d 363, 367.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-413 (Supp. 2000).

(Addendum A ) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1992, Appellee Shaun Sorenson was convicted of two
felonies in California.

Shaun Sorenson is employed with Appellee

Sorenson's Ranch School, a youth program licensed by the
Defendant State of Utah, Department of Human Services, Office of
Licensing.

On January 30, 1998, the Office of Licensing issued a

Notice of Agency Action to Sorenson's Ranch School, notifying the
2

program that Shaun Sorenson did not pass the criminal background
screening requirement found in Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-413.

The

agency action required that either Shaun Sorenson's employment be
terminated, or that further licensing sanctions would follow.
The informal administrative proceeding that followed upheld the
agency's action based on its interpretation of the statute.
Appellees appealed to the district court.

The

Because the only

issue was one of statutory interpretation, the parties filed
motions for summary judgment regarding the correct interpretation
of Utah Code Ann. section 62A-4a-413.

In a ruling entered

September 25, 2000, the district court granted the Sorensons'
cross-motion for summary judgment
judgment motion.

and denied the State's summary

The State Defendants appealed,
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Sorenson's Ranch School is a youth program 1 that provides
services to youth under a license issued by the State of Utah,

A "youth program" is defined as "a nonresidential program
designed to provide behavioral, substance abuse, or mental health
services to minors that:
(a) serves either adjudicated or nonadjudicated youth;
(b) charges a fee for its services;
(c) may or may not provide host homes or other arrangements
for overnight accommodation of the youth;
(d) may or may not provide all or part of its services in
the outdoors;
(e) may or may not limit or censor access to parents or
guardians;
(f) prohibits or restricts a minor's ability to leave the
program at any time of his own free will; and
(g) will not apply to recreational programs such as Boy
Scouts, Girl Scouts, 4-H, and other such organizations."
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-2-101(20) (Supp. 2000).

3

Department of Human Services, Office of Licensing (Licensing).
(R. 2, 24, 38; T. 13). In 1992, Shaun Sorenson was convicted of
two felonies in California.

Shaun Sorenson, the son of the

Sorenson's Ranch School owner, became employed, at some point, as
a plumber-maintenance worker with the program.

He provided full-

(R. 66).

time plumbing and construction services.

On January

30, 1998, Licensing issued a Notice of Agency Action requiring
either the termination of Shaun Sorenson's employment or
sanctions against the license of Sorenson's Ranch School based on
(R. 10, 53).2

Shaun Sorenson's convicted felon status.

The Sorensons requested an informal administrative hearing
to contest the agency action.

(R. 53). Licensing motioned to

dismiss the hearing request on the basis that no disputed issues
of fact existed to justify a hearing in light of Licensing's
statutory mandate that felons may not be employed in programs
licensed to serve children.

(R. 12, 53).

On February 18, 1998, the Office of Administrative Hearings,
Department of Human Services (OAH), issued an order dismissing
the Sorensons' hearing request on the basis that Shaun Sorenson
was convicted of two felonies in the State of California and,
therefore, no disputed issue of fact existed to require a hearing
under the administrative hearing rules.

2

(R. 13-16, 53).

In 1992, Shaun Sorenson was convicted of two felonies in
the State of California for driving under the influence resulting
in accident, injury, and hit-and-run. (R. 54).
4

The Sorensons requested reconsideration and OAH granted the
motion on the grounds that an issue of fact existed as to whether
Shaun Sorenson provided services or care to children in his
employment with Sorenson's Ranch School.

The order stated that

reconsideration would take the form of a hearing and that the
parties would be notified once it was scheduled.

(R. 17-19, 53-

54) .
Subsequently, both parties briefed the legal issue of
whether Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-413 precludes the licensing of
any facility which employs an individual who does not pass the
criminal background screening or whether that provision only
precludes the employment of such individuals when they deal
directly with children.

(R. 7, 54).

On January 8, 1999, OAH issued an Order denying the
Sorensons' Request for Reconsideration.

In this ruling, OAH

concluded that:
[t]he only sound interpretation of U.C.A. § 62A-4a-413
mandates that youth facilities licensed by Claimant may
not employee [sic] persons who do not pass the criminal
background screening whether they work directly with
children, or, as in this case, work as custodians or in
other positions which do not require direct interaction
with children. The undersigned agrees with Claimant
that the act must be analyzed in its entirety. The
Legislature passed this Act with the specific purpose
of protecting children.
By including both "employee" and "providers of care" in
the statute the Legislature meant to protect children
from all persons who would have access to them.
Custodians, cooks, and other "employees" working in
youth programs have access to children. Indeed at

5

times they may have greater and more secluded access to
children than ''providers of care" such as therapists.
(R. 7-9).
The Sorensons appealed the OAH ruling by filing a Complaint
in district court for a de novo review as provided in Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-15.

(R. 1-19).

The State Defendants and the

Sorensons agreed to proceed by summary judgment motions to
resolve the statutory interpretation dispute.

(R. 32-34).

The

State Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on October
6, 1999.

(R.

35-48).

The sorensons filed a Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment on November 22, 1999.

(R. 49-65).

The parties

argued the summary judgment motions on August 29, 2000.
78).

(R. 76-

The district court, without providing any explanation of

its underlying analysis, granted the Sorensons' motion and denied
the State Defendants' motion in a ruling entered September 25,
2000.

(R. 85-87).

The State Defendants filed their notice of

appeal on October 16, 2000.

(R. 92).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State licensing entity is charged with the
responsibility to check the criminal backgrounds of a wide
variety of individuals associated with programs licensed to serve
children.

The legislature determined that no felons should be

associated with these programs in any capacity under the license
issued by the State.

6

Appellees Shaun Sorenson, a felon, and his employer,
Sorenson's Ranch School, challenged the State's interpretation of
the unambiguous statute.

The trial court erroneously granted

summary judgment in favor of the Appellees, adopting their
tortured reading of the statute.
Although both "employees" and "providers of care" are
prohibited from providing any aspect of a youth program when a
felony appears in their criminal background, the trial court
ignored the specific distinction between these terms and merged
them in its statutory interpretation.

The court determined that

only felons who provide direct services to children are
prohibited from employment with the licensed program even though
the statute itself does not draw the same distinctions.

The

court's skewed interpretation rendered the statute meaningless.
The trial court's ruling is contrary to accepted and sound
principles of statutory construction.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING AN INTERPRETATION
OF SECTION 62A-4a-413 THAT RENDERS THE STATUTE
MEANINGLESS BY ALLOWING FELONS TO BE EMPLOYED BY
PROGRAMS LICENSED TO SERVE CHILDREN.
The State appeals the district court's ruling granting
summary judgment in favor of Shaun Sorenson and Sorenson's Ranch
School (the Sorensons) and denying summary judgment as to the
State Defendants.

Although the district court provided no

written explanation of its underlying rationale, it essentially
7

adopted the Sorensons' interpretation of section 62A-4a-413 and
rejected the State's.

The Sorensons' interpretation of the

statute allows Shaun Sorenson, a convicted felon, to continue to
be employed in a youth program licensed to serve children.

The

State challenges that statutory interpretation adopted by the
district court.
A. The Trial Court's Interpretation of 62A-4a-413
Renders Portions Of The Statute Superfluous, Contrary
to Statutory Interpretation Principles.
Section 62A-4a-413 provides:
(1)(a) As of July 1, 1990, each public or private
agency or individual licensed by the department to
provide child placing services, youth programs,
substitute, foster, or institutionalized care to
children shall, in order to obtain or renew a license
under Section 62A-2-108, submit to the department the
name and other identifying information, which may
include fingerprints, of new and proposed:
(i) owners;
(ii) directors;
(iii) members of the governing
body;
(iv) employees;
(v) providers of care; and
(vi) volunteers, except parents of
children enrolled in the
programs.
(b) The Criminal Investigations and Technical
Services Division of the Department of Public
Safety, established in Section 53-10-103,
shall process that information to determine
whether the individual has been convicted of
any crime.
(c) If an individual has not lived in Utah
for five years, the individual shall submit
fingerprints for a FBI national criminal
history record check. The fingerprints shall
be submitted to the FBI through the Criminal
Investigations and Technical Services
Division.

8

(2) An owner, director, member of the governing body,
employee, provider of care, or volunteer who has a
felony conviction may not provide child placing
services, foster care, youth programs, substitute care,
or institutionalized care for children in facilities or
programs licensed by the department.
(3) The office shall adopt rules defining the
circumstances under which an owner, director, member of
the governing body, employee, provider of care, or
volunteer who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may
provide services described in Subsection (1)(a).
(emphasis added).
The first paragraph defines who must submit to a criminal
background check, and the second paragraph provides that if any
of those same individuals has a felony conviction, the felon may
not provide "child placing services, foster care, youth programs,
substitute care, or institutionalized care for children in
facilities and programs licensed by the department."
Ann.

§ 62A-4a-413

(Supp. 1997).

Utah Code

Although the second paragraph is

not a model of clarity, it is clear that both employees and
providers of care are prohibited from providing "youth programs"
if either individual has a felony conviction.
In a nutshell, the statute provides that, in order to be
licensed as a program to serve children, a broad group of
individuals associated with the program must submit their names
for purposes of criminal background screening.

Once that

screening is completed, if an individual has a felony conviction
of any type, that person may not be associated with the licensed
program in any of the capacities described in paragraph (1).

9

The State's position is simple and is based on sound
principles of statutory construction: section 62A-4a-413
prohibits a convicted felon, like Shaun Sorenson, from being
employed by a program licensed to serve children.

Throughout the

proceedings below, the Sorensons argued that, under their
interpretation of the statute, the phrase "may not provide . . .
youth programs" in paragraph (3) means may not provide
services

to children.

direct

Therefore, the Sorensons claim that only

felons who provide those "direct services" to children are
prohibited from employment in the licensed youth program.

(R.

56-62; T. 10-11, 17, 20). However, because the Sorensons1
interpretation would render parts of the statute meaningless or
superfluous, their interpretation is legally flawed.
If the Sorensons' interpretation were adopted, the terms
"employees" and "providers of care" would be merged and the term
"employee" rendered meaningless.

Of the categories listed in

subsection (1), the "provider of care" category clearly describes
individuals who provide "direct services" to children.

If the

legislature's sole concern was individuals who provide "direct
services" to children, they could have easily specified such an
intent.

Instead, the legislature included categories of

individuals, in addition to "providers of care," such as owners,
directors, members of the governing body, employees and
volunteers.

Thus, the requirement to check the criminal

10

background of an '"employee" becomes superfluous if only the
criminal background of a "provider of care" is pertinent.
Proper statutory construction requires statutes to be
construed so that effect is given to all their provisions, "so
that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another."
Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 583 (Utah App. 1998).
By interpreting the language "provide youth programs" as
equivalent to provision of "direct services," the lower court has
rendered the statute as a whole meaningless.

Members of a

governing body do not, by definition, provide direct services to
consumers in a program.

See Utah Admin, Code, R501-2-3. The

lower court's interpretation essentially merges the terms
"employee" and "provider of care."

Thus the lower court has

ignored the accepted statutory construction principles which
require harmonizing the statute as a whole in light of the
statute's intent and purpose.
B.

The Purpose Of The Statute Is To Protect Children,

Although the statutory language at issue is not ambiguous,
the legislative intent provides additional insight to this Court.
If there is doubt about the meaning of an act, uit is appropriate
to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective,
and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with its intent and
purpose."

State ex rel. A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah App.

11

1997) (quoting State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah App.
1993); see also Harmon City, Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior. 907 P.2d
1162 (Utah 1995); Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake
County, 913 P.2d 723 (Utah 1995); State v. Westerman. 945 P.2d
695 (Utah App. 1997); O'Keefe v. Utah St. Retirement Bd., 929
P.2d 1112 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Chmdgren. 777 P.2d 527
(Utah App. 1989).
This statute is clearly intended to protect children.

In

addition to the language of section 62A-4a-413, one need only
look at the surrounding statutes to glean the legislature's
underlying intent and purpose.

Section 62A-4a-413 appears in the

Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Requirements section, and the
legislative purpose of protecting children is clearly articulated
in section 62A-4a-401.

See State ex rel. A.B., 936 P.2d 1091,

1097 ("we read a statute to harmonize it with related statutes .
. .; "statutes must be interpreted harmoniously with other
statutes relevant to the subject matter.") (citations omitted).
The interpretation espoused by the Sorensons is that only
employees who provide "direct services" to children are covered
by paragraph 2.

For example, under the Sorensons1

interpretation, an employee designated as a cook, an absentee
owner who walks through the facility once a month, or a janitor
or maintenance worker would not be subject to criminal background
screening. However, such individuals would clearly have access to
the youth/children.
12

The statute does not mention "direct services" anywhere, but
does state that both employees and providers of care in programs
licensed by the department are subject to criminal background
screening.

The statute also states that employees and providers

of care with felony convictions are prohibited from providing
"youth programs."

A reasonable interpretation of the phrase

"providing youth programs" is that anyone employed by the program
serving youth is included.
By including both the terms "employee" and "providers of
care," the legislature clearly intended to protect children from
all persons associated with a program who might have access to
children.

In other words, the statute presumes access.

Any

other interpretation would render this statute meaningless and
would result in the serious consequence of placing children at
risk.

Every individual or employee who is involved with the

operation of the program is part of the network providing
"services" to benefit the youth/children in the program and, more
importantly, has access to the children.
A contrary interpretation would render the separate use of
the terms "employee" and "providers of care" inoperative and
superfluous.

The use of both terms indicate a legislative

purpose toward restricting "access" to children, rather than

13

distinguishing between those who provide services and those who
do not.3
Furthermore, if the Sorensons' interpretation were adopted,
the statute would become confusing at best.

The Sorensons'

interpretation would require a background check of an employee
which would never even be used.

This scenario would simply

create additional liability for an agency which would then have
knowledge of an employee's criminal background, but would be
unable to act upon that knowledge.
The statute creates a duty for State Licensing to research
criminal backgrounds for the protection of children.

If

Licensing has knowledge through a background screening that a
program employs a convicted child abuser, and Licensing knows the
3

The legislative history of this provision supports the
State's interpretation. (See Addendum D). In 1990, the statute
(then numbered 62A-4-514) required criminal background screening
of only employees, providers of care and volunteers to the
department. Paragraph 3 regarding misdemeanor convictions
referred to "employment" with the licensed programs. In 1991,
"youth programs" were added to the list of programs and the
category of "volunteers to the department" was modified to read
simply "volunteers." In 1995, owners, directors, and members of
the governing body were added to the list of individuals
screened.
Paragraph 3 regarding misdemeanor convictions was
modified to delete the narrower concept of employment and replace
it with "provide . . . any youth program." In 1998, paragraph 3
was rewritten to specify that individuals with certain
misdemeanors may not "provide the services described in
Subsection (1) (a),'1 in essence, treating the entire youth program
as a specified "service."
With the later addition of owners, directors, and governing
board members, and with the change from an employment focus to
the broader focus of "providing" a program, this history
demonstrates that "access" - rather than provision of direct
services - is the driving force behind this statute.
14

employee has potential access to children - regardless of whether
his job description contemplates actual provision of "direct
services" to children -

Licensing could be subject to liability

if a child in the program is victimized.

Cf.

C.T. v. Martinez,

845 P.2d 246, 247-48 (Utah 1992) (although statute may create a
"special relationship giving rise to a tort duty of care,"
negligence claim against a licensing entity failed because
statutory requirements in effect at the time did not require a
criminal record check).
In sum, adopting an interpretation of section 62A-4a-413
that renders the terms "employee" and "providers of care"
superfluous or meaningless contravenes basic principles of
statutory construction.

The legislature is presumed to use

statutory terms advisedly.

C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, %9, 977

P.2d 479, 481; Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, 974 P.2d 306; Olsen
v. Samuel Mclntvre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257 (Utah 1998); Reedeker
v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577 (Utah App. 1998) .

The legislature

could have easily specified that only felons who provided "direct
services" to the children in the program were barred from
employment.

Instead, the legislature included the broader

category of "employees," as well as the service-provider category
-- "providers of care" - - i n its prohibition.4
4

To interpret the

The idea of barring all felons from certain activities or
positions, regardless of the type of felony and its connection to
the position sought, is not without precedent. See Utah Code
Ann. §§ 7-1-508 (prohibiting felons from serving as officers,
15

statute any other way frustrates the legislature's intent and
purpose to protect children, and thereby places children at risk.
ORAL ARGUMENT; PUBLICATION OF OPINION
The State requests oral argument and a published opinion.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the State respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Appellees and grant judgment in
favor of the State based on its interpretation of section 62A-4a413.
DATED this

7

day of May, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEPP
Attorney General

CAROL L. C. VERDOIA
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah

directors, or employees of a depository institutions) and 46-3201(1) (b) (prohibiting felons from being employed as operative
personnel with a certification authority regarding notarization
and authentication of documents and digital signatures) (Supp.
2000) .
16
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caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, two true and exact copies
of the Brief of Appellant State of Utah to the following:
Dale P. Eyre
Attorney at Law
175 North Main Street
P.O. Box 72 8
Richfield, Utah 84701
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

62A-4a-413.

Agencies and individuals providing services to
children -- Felony or misdemeanor conviction.
(1)(a) As of July 1, 1990, each public or private agency
or individual licensed by the department to provide
child placing services, youth programs, substitute,
foster, or institutionalized care to children shall, in
order to obtain or renew a license under Section 62A-2108, submit to the department the name and other
identifying information, which may include
fingerprints, of new and proposed:
(i) owners;
(ii) directors;
(iii)members of the governing body;
(iv) employees;
(v) providers of care; and
(vi) volunteers, except parents of children enrolled in
the program.
(b) The Criminal Investigations and Technical Services
Division of the Department of Public Safety,
established in Section 53-10-103, shall process that
information to determine whether the individual has
been convicted of any crime.
(c) If an individual has not lived in Utah for five
years, the individual shall submit fingerprints for a
FBI national criminal history record check. The
fingerprints shall be submitted to the FBI through the
Criminal Investigations and Technical Services
Division.
(2) An owner, director, member of the governing body,
employee, provider of care, or volunteer who has a felony
conviction may not provide child placing services, foster
care, youth programs, substitute care, or institutionalized
care for children in facilities or programs licensed by the
department.
(3) The office shall adopt rules defining the circumstances
under which an owner,
director, member of the governing
body, employee, provider of care, or volunteer who has been
convicted of a misdemeanor may provide services described in
Subsection(1)(a).

ADDENDUM B

COPY

STATE OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
STATE OF UTAH
Office of Licensing,
Claimant,

ORDER DENYING
REQUEST FOR
RECONSIDERATION

vs.
SHAUN SORENSON,
Respondent.

This matter came for hearing before Mary A. Rudolph, Hearing Officer, on Thursday, the
30th day of April, 1998. The record was left open for an indefinite period of time to allow the
parties to appropriately brief the issue.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 30, 1998, Claimant filed a Notice of Agency action alleging that Respondent's
license should be revoked due to employment of Shaun Sorenson, who had two felony convictions
which were uncovered during a Criminal Background Screening. The Office of Administrative
Hearings dismissed Respondent's initial hearing request but granted Respondent's Request for
Reconsideration. Both parties then briefed the issue of whether U.C.A. § 62A-41-413 precludes
the licensing of any facility which employees an individual who does not pass the BCI
investigation or whether that provision only prevents employing such persons in programs dealing
directly with children.

FINDINGS
The undersigned finds that the only sound interpretation of ILCLA, § 62A-4a-413 mandates
that youth facilities licensed by Claimant may not employee persons who do not pass the criminal

background screening whether they work directly with children, or, as in this case, work as
custodians or in other positions which do not require direct interaction with children. The
undersigned agrees with Claimant that the act must be analyzed in its entirety. The Legislature
passed this Act with the specific purpose of protecting children.
By including both "employee" and "providers of care" in the statute the Legislature meant
to protect children from all persons who would have access to them. Custodians, cooks and other
"employees" working in youth programs have access to children. Indeed, at times they may have
greater and more secluded access to children than "providers of care" such as therapists.
The undersigned hereby concludes that Respondent's Request for Reconsideration be
denied.

ORDER
Respondent's Request for Reconsideration is hereby denied and Claimant's Notice of
Agency Action is upheld.
JUDICIAL REVIEW of this Order may be obtained by filing a Complaint in the Juvenile
Court in the county where the petitioner resides or maintains his principal place of business within
thirty (30) days after the date this Order was issued. A copy of said Complaint, if any, should be
served upon each party to the action in accordance with the provisions inU.C.A. § 63-46b-15.
us U5
Dated this

day of

.QiAjAJUnA^

MARY A. RUDOLPH
Hearing Officer
Department of Human Services
120 North 200 West - Suite 122
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: 538-3900
-2-

,1999.

a^yc

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this ^ &

dayof S ^ ^ y y ^ ^ ^ —

1999,

I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of $gr foregoing Order Denying
Request for Reconsideration to the following parties of record:
Shaun Sorenson
c/o Dale P. Eyre
Attorney at Law
175 North Main Street
P.O. Box 728
Richfield, Utah 84701
Dale P. Eyre
Attorney at Law
175 North Main Street
P.O. Box 728
Richfield, Utah 84701
Sorensons Ranch School
P.O. Box 440219
Koosharem, Utah 84744
and to the following parties via inter-office mail:
Department of Human Services
Office of Licensing - Suite 209
120 North 200 West
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attn: Darcy Anderson

SECRETARY

ADDENDUM C

CAROL L. C. VERDOIA - #5049
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM - #1231
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140833
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0833
Telephone: (801) 366-0250
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SORENSON'S RANCH SCHOOL and
SHAUN SORENSON,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER ON OPPOSING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MOTIONS

RETA D. ORAM, DIRECTOR,
STATE OF UTAH,
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
OFFICE OF LICENSING,

Judge David L. Mower

Defendant.

Civil No. 990600045 AA

This matter came before the Court for oral argument on
August 29, 2000, the Honorable David L. Mower presiding, upon
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court, having reviewed the

pleadings submitted by the parties and heard the arguments of
counsel for both parties, enters the following order:
ORDER
1.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

2.

Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted.

DATED this

^ day of September, 2000.
BY THE COURT

U
DAVID L. MOWER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

I I^

day of September,

2000, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and exact
copy of the foregoing ORDER ON OPPOSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS
to the following:
Dale P. Eyre
Attorney at Law
175 North Main Street
P.O. Box 728
Richfield, Utah 84701

ADDENDUM D

L a w s of U t a h - 1990

C h . 122
CHAPTER 122
H. B. No. 335
Passed February 21, 1990
Approved March 8, 1990
Effective July 1, 1990

CHILD ABUSE AMENDMENTS
By Don E Bush
Martin R. Stephens
AN ACT RELATING TO FAMILY SERVICES;
REPEALING CHILD ABUSE REGISTRY;
PROVIDING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND
INVESTIGATION FOR CHILD CARE EMPLOYEES; LIMITING EMPLOYMENT OF
PERSONS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS IN
LICENSED CHILD CARE FACILITIES; AND
PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.

(3) With regard to an employee or provider of care
who has a misdemeanor conviction, the executive
director has discretion to determine whether or not
that person may be employed by any child careT
child placing, foster care, substitute care, or institutionalized care for children in a facility or program
licensed by the department.
Section 2. Repealer.
Section 62A-4-512, Statewide central register,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter
1, Laws of Utah 1988, is repealed.
Section 3. Effective Date.
This act takes effect on July 1, 1990.

THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:
AMENDS:

62A-4-514, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 1, LAWS
OF UTAH 1988
REPEALS:
62A^-512, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 1, LAWS
OF UTAH 1988
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section Amended.
Section 62A-4-514, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
ai enacted by Chapter 1, Laws of Utah 1988, is
amended to read:
62A-4-614. Placement of children — Determ i n a t i o n of no report of child abuse.
U) [Each] As ofJuly 1,1990, each public or private
agency or individual [involved in placing children
ml licensed by the department to provide day care
services, child placing services, substitute, foster, or
institutionalized care to children shall, [by submittwig] in order to obtain or renew a license under Section 62A-2-108, submit the name and other identifying information, including fingerprints, of [the)
proposed [placement environment to the statewide
central register, determine that a verified report of
child abuse or neglect naming that proposed place
ment as the responsible party, has not been mode. If
such a verified report cxiots, the ehild may not be
placed in that proposed placement cnvironment^mtil a statement approving that placement has been
obtained from the division. Failure to submit the
necessary information to the statewide central rcg
istcr prior to placement of a ehild may be grounds for
suspension, revocation, or refusal to renew a child
placement license.] employees, providers of care,
and volunteers to the department. The Bureau of
Criminal Identification shall process that information to determine whether the individual has been
convicted of any crime.
(2) An employee, provider of care, or volunteer
who has a felony conviction may not provide child
care, child placing services, foster care, substitute
care, or institutionalized care for children in facilities or programs licensed by the department.
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L a w s of u t a n - i r a i
CHAPTER 192
H.B. No. 196
Passed February 25, 1991
Approved March 16, 1991
Effective April 29, 1991
BACKGROUND CHECKS ON
CHILD CARE WORKERS
By Martin R Stephens
AN ACT RELATING TO FAMILY SERVICES;
CLARIFYING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
FOR CHILD CARE EMPLOYEES; AND PROVIDING FOR CRIMINAL BACKGROUND
INVESTIGATION OF EMPLOYEES OF
YOUTH PROGRAMS.
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS.
AMENDS:
62A-4-514, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER
122, LAWS OF UTAH 1990
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah.
Section 1. Section Amended.
Section 62A-4-514, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as last amended by Chapter 122, Laws ofUtah 1990,
is amended to read:
62A-4-514. Placement of children — Determination of no report of child abuse.
(1) As of July 1, 1990, each public or private
agency or individual licensed by the department to
provide day care services, child placing services,
youth programs, substitute, foster, or institutionalized care to children shall, in order to obtain or renew a license under Section 62A-2-108, submit to
the department the name and other identifying mformation, including fingerprints, of new and proposed:
(a) employees^];
(b) providers of caret;]; and
(c) volunteers [to the department].
The Bureau of Criminal Identification shall process that information to determine whether the individual has been convicted of any crime.
(2) An employee, provider of care, or volunteer
who has a felony conviction may not provide child
care, child placmg services, foster care, substitute
care, or institutionalized care for children in facilities or programs licensed by the department.
(3) With regard to an employee or provider of care
who has a misdemeanor conviction, the executive
director has discretion to determine whether or not
that person may be employed by any child care,
child placmg, foster care, substitute care, or institutionalized care for children m a facihty or program
licensed by the department.
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Laws of U t a h - 1992

Ch. 225
CHAPTER 225
S. B. No. 148
Passed February 26, 1992
Approved March 13, 1992
Effective July 1, 1992

(2) An employee, provider of care, or volunteer
who has a felony conviction may not provide child
care, child placing services, foster care, substitute
care, or institutionalized care for children in facilities or programs licensed by the department.

JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER AND VICTIM
TREATMENT PROGRAM AND FUNDING

(3) With regard to an employee or provider of care
who has a misdemeanor conviction, the executive
director has discretion to determine whether or not
that person may be employed by any child care,
child placing, foster care, substitute care, or institutionalized care for children in a facility or program
licensed by the department.

By Delpha A. Baird
AN ACT RELATING TO SOCIAL SERVICES;
PROVIDING FOR COORDINATED SERVICES FOR AT RISK CHILDREN AND
YOUTH ACT; ESTABLISHING STATEWIDE
AND REGIONAL UNITS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROGRAMS FOR THE SUPERVISION AND TREATMENT OF JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS; ESTABLISHING
THE AUTHORITY AND DUTIES OF THESE
UNITS; APPROPRIATING $50,000 FROM
THE GENERAL FUND TO THIS PROGRAM;
REMOVING REQUIREMENT THAT LICENSED AGENCIES OR INDIVIDUALS
THAT PROVIDE CHILD CARE SERVICES
SUBMIT BACKGROUND INFORMATION
TO THE BUREAU OF CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION ON VOLUNTEERS; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.

Section 2. Section Enacted.
Section 62A-7-301, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
is enacted to read:
62A-7-301. Juvenile sex offender unit — Purpose — Members — Duties — Staff specialists.
(1) There is established within the Department of
Human Services, the Division of Youth Corrections,
a statewide juvenile sex offender supervision and
treatment unit which is a pilot program existing
from July 1,1992 through June 30,1995. This statewide unit shall involve the coordinated efforts of the
Division of Family Services, the Division of Youth
Corrections, and juvenile court probation.

THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:

(a) The purposes of the statewide unit are to:
(i) promote the protection of children by the early
identification, supervision, and treatment of juvenile sex offenders:

AMENDS:
62A-t-514, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER
192, LAWS OF UTAH 1991

(ii) research supervision and treatment programs
of juvenile sex offenders and evaluate their effectiveness;

ENACTS:
62A-7-301, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953
62A-7-302, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953
62A-7-303, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953

(iii) foster the development of effective supervision and treatment programs for juvenile sex offenders;

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section Amended.

(iv) establish standards for the diagnosis, classification, supervision, and treatment of juvenile sex
offenders;

Section 62A-4-514, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as last amended by Chapter 192, Laws of Utah 1991,
is amended to read:

(v) develop and conduct annual training seminars
to be available to members of regional units as established in Section 62A-7-302 and to personnel of
the Division of Family Services, the Division of
Youth Corrections, the juvenile court, law enforcement, and prosecutors involved with the investigation, supervision, and treatment of juvenile sex offenders;

62A-4-514. Placement of children — Determination of no report of child abuse.
(1) As of July 1, 1990, each public or private
agency or individual licensed by the department to
provide day care services, child placing services,
youth programs, substitute, foster, or institutionalized care to children shall, in order to obtain or renew a license under Section 62A-2-108, submit to
the department the name and other identifying information, including fingerprints, of new and proposed:

(vi) coordinate the work of regional units;
(vii) manage funds;
(viii) apply for public and private grants: and

(a) employees:

(ix) report annually in October to the Judiciary Interim Committee, the governor, and the Judicial
Council.

(b) providers of care: and
<c) volunteers, except parents of children enrolled
in the programs.

<b) The statewide unit shall consist of one representative selected by the executive director and the
officer of the Judicial Council, respectivejpresiding
-

The Bureau of Criminal Identification shall process that information to determine whether the individual has been convicted of any crime.

(i) the Division of Family Services:
R42

G e n e r a l S e s s i o n - 1995
CHAPTER 109
H. B. 82
Passed February 15, 1995
Approved March 10, 1995
Effective May 1,1995

C h . 109

care, child placing, foster care, youth programs.
substitute care, or institutionalized care for
children in a facility or program licensed by the
department.

BACKGROUND SCREENING
REQUIREMENTS FOR
CHILD SERVICE PROVIDERS
Sponsor: David M. Jones
AN ACT RELATING TO HUMAN SERVICES;
CLARIFYING
FINGERPRINTING
REQUIREMENTS FOR CHILD SERVICE
PROVIDERS.
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated
1953 as follows:
AMENDS:
62A-4a-413, as renumbered and amended by
Chapter 260, Laws of Utah 1994
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section 62A-4a-413 is amended
to read:
62A-4a-413. Agencies and individuals
providing services to children — Felony or
misdemeanor conviction.
(1) (a) As of July 1, 1990, each public or private
agency or individual licensed by the department to
provide [day] child care services, child placing
services, youth programs, substitute, foster, or
institutionalized care to children shall, in order to
obtain or renew a license under Section 62A-2-108,
submit to the department the name and other
identifying information, which may include
fingerprints, of new and proposed:
(Downers;
(ii) directors;
(Hi) members of the governing body;
[te4] (iv) employees;
[&)] (v) providers of care; and
M\ (vi) volunteers, except parents of children
enrolled in the programs.
(b) The Law Enforcement and Technical Services
Division of the Department of Public Safety shall
process that information to determine whether the
individual has been convicted of any crime.
(2) An owner, director, member of the governing
body, employee, provider of care, or volunteer who
has a felony conviction may not provide child care,
child placing services, foster care, youth programs.
substitute care, or institutionalized care for
children in facilities or programs licensed by the
department.
(3) With regard to an owner, director, member of
the governing body, employee, or provider of care
who has a misdemeanor conviction, the executive
director has discretion to determine whether or not
that person may (bo employod by) provide any child
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Ch. 329

care for children, in accordance with Section
78-3a-307.1. If an FBI fingerprint background
check is required pursuant to Section 78-3a-3Q7.1,
the provider may be provisionally licensed.

^tion 14. Section 62A-4a-250 is enacted to
read:
part 2A. Minors in Custody on Grounds
Other Than Abuse or Neglect

(2) An owner, director, member of the governing
body, employee, provider of care, or volunteer who
has a felony conviction may not provide child care,
child placing services, foster care, youth programs,
substitute care, or institutionalized care for
children in facilities or programs licensed by the
department.

b^\-4a-250.

Separate programs and
-^focedures for minors committed to the
custody of the Division of Child and
Family Services on grounds other than
abuse or neglect.
(D On or before July 1, 1998. the division shall
have established programs designed to meet tHe
^eds of minors who have not been adjudicated as
lEused or neglected, but who are otherwise
^mmitted to the custody of the division by the
juvenile court pursuant to Section 78-3a-U8, and
^Ro are classified in the division's management
information system as having been placed In
custody primarily on the basis of delinquent
behavior or a status offense.

(3) With regard io an owner, director, member of
the governing body, employee, or provider of care
who has a misdemeanor conviction, the executive
director has discretion to determine whether or not
that person may provide any child care, child
placing, foster care, youth programs, substitute
care, or institutionalized care for children in a
facility or program licensed by the department.
Section 16. Section 62A-4a-607 is amended
to read:

(2) (a) The processes and procedures designed to
meet the needs of children who are abused "or
neglected, described in Part 2 and in Title 78,
Chapter 3a, Part 3, Abuse, Neglect, and
Dependency Proceedings, are not applicable to the
minors described in Subsection (1).

62A-4a-607. Promotion of adoption.
(1) The division and all agencies licensed under
this-part shall promote adoption when that is a
possible and appropriate alternative for a child.
Specifically, the division shall actively promote the
adoption of all children in its custody who have a
[permanency goal ofl final plan for termination of
parentalrightspursuant to Section 78-3a-312, or a
permanency goal of adoption (and who are eligible
for adoptieaj!

(b) The procedures described in Subsection
7a-3a-119(2Xa) are applicable to the minors
described in Subsection (1).
Section 15. Section 62A-4a-413 is amended
to read:

(2) The division shall obtain or conduct research
of prior adoptive families to determine what
families may do to be successful with their adoptive
children and shall make this research available to
potential adoptive parents.

62A-4a-413. Agencies and individuals
providing services to children — Felony or
misdemeanor conviction.
(1) (a) As of July 1,1990, each public or private
agency or individual licensed by the department to
provide child care services, child placing services,
youth
programs,
substitute,
foster,
or
institutionalized care to children shall, in order to
obtain or renew a license under Section 62A-2-108,
submit to the department the name and other
identifying information, which may include
fingerprints, of new and proposed:

8ection 17. Section 62A-12-282.1 is amended
to read:
62A-12-282.1. Residential and inpatient
settings — Commitment proceeding —
Child in physical custody of local mental
health authority.
(1) A child may receive services from a local
mental health authority in an inpatient or
residential setting only after a commitment
proceeding, for the purpose of transferring physical
custody, has been conducted in accordance with the
requirements of this section.
(2) That commitment proceeding shall be
initiated by a petition for commitment, and shall be
a careful, diagnostic inquiry, conducted by a neutral
and detached fact finder, pursuant to the
procedures and requirements of this section. If the
findings described in Subsection (4) exist, the
proceeding shall result in the transfer of physical
custody to the appropriate local mental health
authority, and the child may be placed in an
inpatient or residential setting.

(i) owners;
(ii) directors;
(iii) members of the governing body;
(iv) employees;
(v) providers of care; and
(vi) volunteers, except parents of children
enrolled in the programs.
(b) The Law Enforcement and Technical Services
Division of the Department of Public Safety shall
process that information to determine whether the
individual has been convicted of any crime.
(c) As of July 1, 1997, persons described in
Subsection < lXa) may also be subject to a complete
Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal
background check through the national criminal
history system (NCIC) if they provide out-of-home
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(3) The neutral and detached fact finder who
conducts the inquiry:
(a) shall be a designated examiner, as defined in
Subsection 62A-12-202(3); and
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(b) inspection and compliance with all provisions
of this chapter and applicable rules.

enter and inspect on a routine basis the facilf*
licensee
~" "
-—-£j£*

(2) The office may only suspend a license for a
period of time which does not exceed the current
expiration date of that license.

(2) Before conducting an inspecting Xi^^
Subsection (1), the office shall, aiter iQenTI?£^£
person in charge:
" '
-212*
(a) give proper identification;

(3) When a license has been suspended, the office
may completely or partially restore the suspenaed
license upon a determination that the:
(a) conditions upon which the suspension was
based have been completely or partially corrected;
and
(b) interests of the public will not be jeopardized
by restoration of the license.
Section 14. Section 62A-2-115 is amended
to read:

(b) request to see the applicable license:
(c) describe the nature and purpose of tfc.
inspection; and
"" '
-—
(d) if necessary, explain the authority of the nff^
to conduct the inspection and the penalty l£
refusing to permit the inspection as provided""m
Section 62A-2-U6.
"
•—(3) In conducting an inspection under Subsection
(1), the office may, after meeting the requirement!
of Subsection (2):
~" "
'

62A-2-115. Injunctive relief and other legal
procedures.
In addition to, and notwithstanding, any other
remedy provided by law the department may, in a
manner provided by law and upon the advice of the
attorney general, who shall represent the
department in the proceedings, maintain an action
in the name of the state for injunction or other
process against any person or governmental unit to
restrain
or prevent
the
establishment,
management, or operation of a human services
program or facility in violation of this chapter or
rules (aaade-1 approved by the [committee] board.
Section 15. Section 62A-2-116 is amended
to read:
62A-2-116. Violation — Criminal penalties.
A person who owns, establishes, conducts,
maintains, manages, or operates a human services
[pregraaftOE] facility in violation of this chapter (e*
rules made by the committee] is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor if the violation endangers or harms
the health, welfare, or safety of persons
participating in that program.

(a) inspect the physical facilities;
(b) inspect records and documents;
(c) interview officers, employees, clients, family
members of clients, and others; and
(d) observe the licensee in operation.
(4) An inspection conducted under Subsection (1)
shall be dunng regular business hours and maybe
announced or unannounced.
(5) The human services licensee shall make
copies of inspection reports available to the public
upon request.
(6) The provisions of this section apply to on-site
inspections and do not restrict the office from
contacting family members, neighbors, or other
individuals, or from seeking information from other
sources to determine compliance with the
provisions of this chapter.
Section 18. Section 62A-2-119 is enacted to
read:
62A-2-119. Adoption of inspections,
examinations, and studies.

Section 16. Section 62A-2-117 is enacted to
read:

The office may adopt an inspection, examination,
or study conducted by a public or private entity, as
identified by rule, to determine whether a licensee
has complied with a licensing requirement imposed
by virtue of this chapter."

62A-2-117. Licensure of tribal foster homes.
(1) The Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C Sees
1901-1963, provides that tribes may develop and
implement tribal foster home standards"

Section 19. Section 62A-2-120 is enacted to
read:

(2) The office shall license tribal foster homes
according to standards developed and approved by
the tribe, pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act,
25 U.S.C. Sees 1901-196T

62A-2-120. Criminal background checks.
(1) (a) A human services licensee or individual
applying for or renewing a license to provide
child-placing services, youth programs, substitute
care, foster care, or institutionalized care to
children, shall submit to the department the name
and other identifying information, which may
include fingerprints, of persons associated with the
licensee

(3) If the tribe has not developed standards, the
office shall license tribal foster homes pursuant to
this chapter
Section 17. Section 62A-2-118 is enacted to
read:

(b) The Utah Division of Criminal I nvesttgation of
the Department of Public safety snail process that
information to determine whether tne individual
has been convicted of anv crime

62A-2-118. Administrative inspections.
(1) The office may, for the purpose of ascertaining
compliance with the provisions of this cnapter
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fheinajividuai shall submit fmgerpnnts for a

agency or individual licensed by the department to
provide child placing services, youth programs,
substitute, foster, or institutionalized care to
children shall, in order to obtain or renew a license
under Section 62A-2-108, submit to the
department the name and other identifying
information, which may include fmgerpnnts, of
new and proposed:

^rr^nonal criminal history record checfc. The
r
^7mMnts snail be submitted to the FBI througn
division of Cnminal Investigation.
0) A person associated with the licensee who has
H^v"*conviction may not provide child-placing
^r^T""Foster care, youth programs, substitute
'--j—^r institutionalized care for children in
r^T7ties"or programs licensed by the department.

(i) owners;
(ii) directors;

3) The department shall adopt rules defining the
r^Tmstances under which a person who has been
.'Evicted of a misdemeanor may provide
^•fj.placing services, foster care, youth programs^
-TTSstitute care, or institutionalized care foT
;QcIren in a facility or program licensed by the
department.

(iii) members of the governing body;
(iv) employees;
(v) providers of care; and
(vi) volunteers, except parents of children
enrolled in the programs.

Section 20. Section 62A-2-121 is enacted to
read:

(b)
The [Law Enforcement—and Technical
Services) Utah Division of Criminal Investigation of
the Department of Public Safety shall process that
information to determine whether the individual
has been convicted of any crime.

62A-2-121. Access to abuse and neglect
information for licensing purposes.
(1) With respect to human services licensees, the
department may access only the Division of ChifcT
and Family Service's management informaticin
system created by Section 62A-4a-U6 for the
purpose of:

(c) If an individual has not lived in Utah for five
years, the individual shall submit fingerprints fora
FBI national criminal history record check. The
fingerprints shall be submitted to the FBI through
the Utah Division of Criminal Investigation.

(a) determining whether a person associated with
a licensee, who provides care described in
Subsection (2), has a substantiated finding of abuse
or neglect; and

[(e)—As ef July 1, 1007, persons described in
Subsection (l)(a) may also be subject to a complete
Federal—Bureau ef—Investigation criminal
background cheek through the national criminal
history system (NCIC) if they provide out-ef-home
care for children, in accordance with Section
78-3a 3Q7.1. If an FBI fingerprint background
check is required pursuant to Section 78-3a-3Q7.1,
the provider may be provisionally licensed!]

(b) informing a licensee, who provides care
described in Subsection (2), that a person associate?
with the licensee has a substantiated finding o?
abuse or neglect.
(2) (a) A licensee or individual applying for or
renewing a license to provide child-placing
services, youth programs, substitute care, foster
care, or institutionalized care to children shall
submit to the department the name and other
identifying information of a person associated witR"
the licensee"

(2) An owner, director, member of the governing
body, employee, provider of care, or volunteer who
has a felony conviction may not provide child
placing services, foster care, youth programs,
substitute care, or institutionalized care for
children in facilities or programs licensed by the
department.

(b) The office shall process the information to
determine whether the licensee or a person
associated with a licensee has a substantiate?
finding of child abuse or neglecT

[(3) With regard to an owner, director, member ef
the governing body, employee, or provider ef care
who has a misdemeanor conviction, the executive
director has discretion te determine whether or net
that person may provide any child placing, fester
ea*e,—youth programs, substitute care,—OF
institutionalised care for children in a facility or
program licensed by the department.]

(3) The office shall adopt rules defining the
circumstances under which a person who has a
substantiated finding of child abuse or neglect may
provide child-placing services, foster care, youth
programs, substitute care, or institutionalized care
tor children in a facility licenced by the department?
Section 21. Section 62A~4a-413 is amended
to read:
62A-4a-413. Agencies and individuals
providing services to children — Felony or
misdemeanor conviction.

(3) The Office shall adopt rules defining the
circumstances under which an owner, director,
member of the governing body, employee, provider
of care, or volunteer who has been convicted of a
misdemeanor may provide services described in
Subsection (l)(a).
Section 22. Repealer.
This act repeals:
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